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Abstract. In this study we explain extreme right-wing voting behaviour in the countries of
the European Union and Norway from a micro and macro perspective. Using a multidisci-
plinary multilevel approach, we take into account individual-level social background char-
acteristics and public opinion alongside country characteristics and characteristics of
extreme right-wing parties themselves. By making use of large-scale survey data (N = 49,801)
together with country-level statistics and expert survey data, we are able to explain extreme
right-wing voting behaviour from this multilevel perspective. Our results show that cross-
national differences in support of extreme right-wing parties are particularly due to dif-
ferences in public opinion on immigration and democracy, the number of non-Western
residents in a country and, above all, to party characteristics of the extreme right-wing
parties themselves.
Introduction
The question as to why extreme right-wing parties have become so popular in
some countries of the European Union, whereas in other countries these
parties have only enjoyed modest success or even none at all, has often been
raised. In the late 1990s, this question grew in significance as differences
between Western European countries as to the level of support for extreme
right-wing parties have become larger. In Austria, the Freiheitliche Partei
Österreichs (FPÖ) attracted a quarter of the votes in 1999 and took part in a
coalition government, which resulted in a boycott of Austria by the other 14
Member States of the European Union. The popularity of the Flemish Vlaams
Blok has also increased steadily to 15 per cent of the votes in the 1999 elec-
tions, whereas the Norwegian Fremskrittspartiet and the French Front National
could count on more than 10 per cent of the votes. However, there are other
European countries in which the extreme right wing has failed to attract
voters. In the United Kingdom, the British National Party could not attract
more than one per cent of the vote; in the Netherlands, the Cen-
trumdemokraten was wiped out in Parliament after a small upsurge in 1994;
and, in Spain, few people have ever even heard of the extreme right-wing splin-
ter group Democracia Nacional.
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In this article, we will try to explain differences in extreme right-wing voting
behaviour between 16 Western European countries. So far, cross-national
empirical research on extreme right-wing voting has been scarce, even though
in 1988 von Beyme emphasized that ‘future studies of right-wing extremism
will have to pay more attention to the whole political context of the political
movement’ (von Beyme 1988: 16). The comparative studies that have been
conducted either focused exclusively on the aggregate level or on the indi-
vidual level. In aggregate-level studies, a variety of country-specific charac-
teristics have been related to voter turnout for extreme right-wing parties 
at national elections (Baimbridge et al. 1994, 1995; Betz 1994, 1998; Kitschelt
1995; Husbands 1996; Jackman & Volpert 1996; Knigge 1998). However, in
studying the context, they neglected individual characteristics related to voting
for the extreme right wing. Individual-level studies, on the other hand, did take
into account individual voter characteristics. In these studies, however, cross-
country comparisons have mostly been limited to comparing a few country
case studies (Falter & Schumann 1988; Hainsworth 1992; Kitschelt 1995; Merkl
& Weinberg 1997). Van der Brug et al. (2000) improved upon this strand 
of research by performing individual-level voting analysis in six European
countries simultaneously, but they did not take into account country-level
explanations.
Husbands (1991, 1998) also criticized the common practice to examine
voting from either an individual-level or contextual-level perspective. In his
review of previous research, he extracted the important factors to explain vari-
ations between countries in levels of extreme right-wing support (see 
also Kitschelt 1995; Winkler 1996; Betz 1998; Eatwell 1998; Knigge 1998;
Minkenberg 1998; Mayer 1999). We propose to categorize these explanations
into sociological, economic and political factors. Sociological factors refer to
differences between countries in the composition of the population. Two types
of composition effects are of relevance in the present study: one is related to
the social structure of the country and the other to public opinion within it.
The mere fact that one country, for example, harbours more poorly educated
people or more people with unfavourable attitudes towards ethnic minorities
than another country may explain differences between countries in extreme
right-wing voting. From an economic point of view, economic malaise and
competition between its majority group and immigrants can be considered 
to be relevant in explaining differences in extreme right-wing voting in any
particular country. From a political perspective, party system and party-
specific factors can be considered to be essential too (Husbands 1998).
So far, these factors have been studied in isolation and have not as yet been
integrated into an explanatory model of cross-national differences in extreme
right-wing voting. This article is among the first to take all these factors into
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account for all countries of the European Union and Norway using a multi-
level approach. This approach also allows us to examine how the contextual
and individual levels are interrelated. It brings together a large amount of 
individual-level survey data (N = 49,801). Moreover, country characteristics
are added from census data as well as data from an expert judgement survey
conducted among political scientists in all countries included in the study to
trigger information on the opportunity structure for extreme right-wing
parties as well as their specific characteristics (Lubbers 2000). To summarize,
we answer the question as to what extent differences between countries in
extreme right-wing voting can be explained in terms of (a) composition effects,
(b) country conditions, and (c) characteristics of extreme right-wing parties
themselves. Moreover we examine how individual-level effects differ between
countries and to what extent these differences are influenced by contextual
conditions.
Theories
Differences in social structure
In some contributions it has been argued that social background characteris-
tics are of no (or, at least, of minor) importance in explaining extreme right-
wing voting (Kitschelt 1995; van der Brug et al. 2000). Others argue for the
so-called ‘sociological model’ where background characteristics are crucial for
extreme right-wing voting (Mayer 1999).1 Both branches of research, however,
emphasize that sociopolitical attitudes mediate effects of social background
characteristics on voting for extreme right-wing parties. Previous studies 
have shown that this is indeed the case (Scheepers et al. 1995; Lubbers &
Scheepers 2000, 2001a; Lubbers et al. 2000). Therefore we should take into
account both social structure and public opinion, as countries may differ in
both respects. Let us focus on differences in social structure first.
Previous research has revealed that, in particular, lower social strata are
more likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties. Time and again, it has been
shown that poorer educated people are more likely to vote for anti-immigrant
parties. Furthermore, manual workers and unemployed people are more likely
to do so. There are, however, also some differences between the countries
reported. The Front National (Lubbers & Scheepers 2001a; Mayer 1998), the
FPÖ (Kitschelt 1995) and the Vlaams Blok (Lubbers et al. 2000) did not
merely attract voters from lower social strata, but also gained support from
the middle classes. Nevertheless, the overall picture is quite similar for all
countries. Theories of economic interests (Lipset 1960; Falter & Klein 1994)
extreme right-wing voting in western europe
© European Consortium for Political Research 2002
348
have proposed that those social categories in social positions similar to immi-
grants are more likely to perceive immigrants as an economic threat and will,
therefore, be more likely to vote for an extreme right-wing party which pro-
claims to protect the interests of the social strata under threat. Furthermore,
non-religious people and younger people turned out to be over-represented
among extreme right-wing electorates. Over-representation of these social cat-
egories among the extreme right-wing electorates has been explained by 
theories of social disintegration (Arendt 1951; Kornhauser 1960). These 
theories suggest that people who are, to some extent, unintegrated in society
have a need for substitute intermediary structures that extreme right-wing
parties claim to offer through their nationalistic programmes (Kornhauser
1960). In explaining extreme right-wing voting it is crucial to take into account
these social background characteristics.
If a country harbours more people from those categories more likely to
vote for extreme right-wing parties than another country, this alone could
explain cross-national variation in support for extreme right-wing parties.
Neglecting these composition effects is what Husbands (1991, 1998) described
as one of the largest weaknesses in comparative research on extreme right-
wing voting. Thus, our first hypothesis states that after controlling for dif-
ferences in social structure, differences between Western European countries in
extreme right-wing voting will be reduced.
Differences in public opinion
Why certain social categories are more likely to vote for extreme right-wing
parties is mostly explained by four clusters of attitudinal positions (Ignazi
1992; Billiet & De Witte 1995;Winkler 1996; Mayer 1999; Mudde 1999; Lubbers
& Scheepers 2000): anti-immigrant attitudes, favourable in-group attitudes,
authoritarian attitudes and political dissatisfaction.2 In single-country studies,
all these attitudes were shown to play a role in extreme right-wing voting
(Billiet & De Witte 1995; Kitschelt 1995; Mayer 1998, 1999; Van der Brug 
et al. 2000). However, anti-immigrant attitudes and political dissatisfaction
turned out to be the most important (Lubbers & Scheepers 2000, 2001a;
Lubbers et al. 2000). People who perceive immigrants as a threat (in line with
theories of economic interests) are more likely to blame these out-groups,
and, as a consequence, are more likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties.
People who are politically dissatisfied are likely to cast a protest vote and,
because extreme right-wing parties position themselves as protest parties,
these parties are an attractive option. If, in countries where extreme right-wing
parties are most successful, people are on average more unfavourable towards
out-groups and more politically dissatisfied, we may speak of attitudinal com-
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position effects. Thus, we expect that after controlling for differences in public
opinion, differences between Western European countries in extreme right-wing
voting will be reduced.
Economic country conditions
Economic country characteristics are often taken into account to explain 
variation in the popularity of right-wing extremism between countries 
(Quillian 1995; Anderson 1996; Jackman & Volpert 1996; Knigge 1998). Most
studies have focused on unemployment levels or on ethnic composition.
Results of these studies are based on ecological correlations and give quite
different pictures. Some studies have found a positive effect of unemployment
(Baimbridge et al. 1994, 1995; Jackman & Volpert 1996), whereas others have
found negative effects (Knigge 1998). With respect to ethnic composition,
Kitschelt found little association between ecological levels of extreme right-
wing party turnouts and the proportion of foreign-born population, whereas
Swank and Betz (1996) and Knigge (1998) found strong effects in terms of the
number of asylum seekers and the number of immigrants, respectively.
In order to answer the question of why bad economic circumstances (such
as high unemployment) and the influx of immigrants may be of importance 
in explaining extreme right-wing voting, we can build on theories of economic
interests (Blalock 1967; Olzak 1992). In countries where competition for
scarce resources intensifies due to worsening economic conditions or an
increasing number of immigrants, social groups are more likely to perceive
stronger competition over these scarce resources. Because people are not very
likely to blame their own group (in-group) for these increasingly competitive
circumstances (Tajfel & Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981), they blame others (i.e., out-
groups). To preserve a positive in-group evaluation, out-groups are blamed
and negatively valued characteristics are ascribed to them (Coenders &
Scheepers 1998). Thus, increasing competition may result in exclusionary reac-
tions (Olzak 1992; Scheepers et al. 2001). Out-groups could, however, be per-
ceived as a cultural threat too. In this view, out-groups are viewed as a threat
to Western values and social cohesion. The cultural and economic threats may
however be interwoven. Such threats and the exclusionary reactions towards
out-groups are proclaimed in extreme right-wing programmes, and this may
increase the likelihood of voting for extreme right-wing parties when compe-
tition increases. In countries where the unemployment level is higher and the
number of immigrants is larger, support for extreme right-wing parties is greater.
Note that these hypotheses relate to between-country differences. Previous
research has shown that variation in extreme right-wing support within coun-
tries was not explained by regional variation in unemployment levels. Obvi-
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ously, the intra-country effect of economic conditions can be absent, while
inter-country effects can be present at the same time.
Political country conditions
An additional approach to explain extreme right-wing voting is to focus more
specifically on political factors. Kitschelt (1995) has stressed the importance
of opportunity structures for extreme right-wing parties. He has argued that
convergence between the major moderate left-wing and major moderate right-
wing parties opens up the possibility for a radical party to position itself suc-
cessfully on the extreme at either side. His focus on the players in the political
arena that may have paved the way for extreme right-wing parties may be
crucial, but it is questionable whether convergence would affect voting behav-
iour as Kitschelt has proposed. A social democrat party moving to the right
(and thus narrowing the gap to the major moderate right-wing party) would
indeed create space at its left side, but could also (re)attract manual workers
considering voting for the extreme right wing. As the left-wing/right-wing 
scale is not the only dimension Kitschelt (1995) refers to in his spatial analy-
sis, the opportunity structure approach would be more useful if it were not
operationalized in such general left and right terms. Therefore, we take into
account the positioning of political parties with respect to their immigration
policy. If there is one issue with which the extreme right wing has made itself
heard, it has been a restrictive position towards immigration. If other players
in the political arena have picked up this theme too, we could expect those
parties to have stolen a march on the extreme right-wing parties. This has been
put forward as an explanation of the failure of the extreme right in Germany
(Betz 1994; Kitschelt 1995) and the Netherlands (Powel 1998). From this line
of reasoning we expect that in countries where the political space on the immi-
gration issue for extreme right-wing parties is larger, support for these parties is
larger.
Another political explanation contradicts this line of reasoning.
Thraenhardt (1992) argues that a more restrictive immigration climate in
general increases support for widespread ethnic exclusion. Thus, an intensifi-
cation of the public debate on asylum seekers and restrictions on immigration
may not keep voters away from the far right, but may instead have the oppo-
site effect. Under conditions of a more restrictive immigration policy, people
are more likely to perceive asylum seekers to be a problem or to feel more
free to express anti-immigrant stances (a ‘de-tabooing process’) and are, con-
sequently, more likely to support restrictive immigration policies. Indeed, in
Germany, support for the extreme right became more widespread when the
debate on asylum seekers between the CDU/CSU and SPD became ‘hysteri-
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cal’ (Lubbers & Scheepers 2001b). Therefore, we expect that in countries
where the political climate for immigration is more restrictive, support for
extreme right-wing parties is larger.
Characteristics of extreme right-wing parties
Finally, we also focus on extreme right-wing parties themselves. Van der Brug
et al. (2000) argued that party size matters, to the extent that votes for small
extreme right-wing parties are regarded as wasted votes. The disadvantage of
party size as a predictor of extreme right-wing voting is that it cannot explain
changes in extreme right-wing support over time, since small parties accord-
ing to this view can never gain electoral success. It seems more illuminating
to follow Husbands (1998) who argues that extreme right-wing parties, just
like other parties, gain support only when they are well-organized, and to that
extent have created a solid basis for electoral success. Therefore, in this article
we take such characteristics of extreme right-wing parties into account. De
Witte (1998) provides an explanation for differences in success between the
extreme right in Flanders and the Netherlands, as the Vlaams Blok managed
to build a good working organization, whereas the Dutch Centrumdemokraten
failed to do so. This was due to the presence in Flanders of a range of 
Flemish-nationalist groups and clubs with which the party could easily 
connect. The availability at a local and regional level of people actively
working for a party creates opportunities to campaign more effectively and
attract voters. Kitschelt has pointed to the significance of organizational
aspects too. He claimed that a better organizational structure not only has
instrumental significance such that better-organized parties are better man-
agers of voter mobilization, but has a programmatic message too (Kitschelt
1995, 71).
Another factor used by Husbands (1998) to explain the success of the right,
but also a popular explanation in the media, is the charisma of party leaders.
Husbands argues that the extreme right in the Netherlands and in the United
Kingdom has never had qualified or respected leaders. It is often suggested
that Le Pen and Haider ‘moved the masses’ all by themselves. Charisma theory
states that leaders are not charismatic in themselves, but only because of how
they relate and interact with society (Lindholm 1990; van Dooren 1994).
Weber, whose views have dominated the discourse on charisma for decades,
stressed that an individual is considered a ‘leader’ when he is judged by others
to be exceptionally gifted (van Dooren 1994). But according to Durkheim
(1965), a leader is the group incarnate – that is, the group finds its common
ideal in this leader. Moreover, authority is often bestowed on extreme right-
wing leaders as a consequence of the hierarchical organization of the party
extreme right-wing voting in western europe
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(Kitschelt 1995). In terms of the ‘authoritarian personality’ (Adorno et al.
1982), an authoritarian leader fulfils people’s need to subordinate to powerful
people in order to relieve experiences of fear (see also Fromm 1942).
Hitler is an example of an authoritative charismatic leader in most studies
of charisma theory. It is therefore no surprise that charisma is treated mostly
as a bad thing, particularly by social psychologists (Lindholm 1990). Recent
analyses of charisma appear to come closer to Durkheim’s original views:
people are more willing to support candidates who mirror popular values than
to support perceived losers. In a media-centred society, a party leader’s
appearance would be particularly important. An image of the leader as
‘provider’, ‘law-giver’ or ‘hero’ (van Dooren 1994) can meet individuals’ needs
arising from social or individual crises. Growing political alienation may turn
to ‘a narcissistic longing to be heard and to be taken care of by those in author-
ity, a revived longing for a provider’ (van Dooren 1994) or a nostalgic law-
giver or hero of the people. By taking into account party characteristics we
may, therefore, expect that in countries where extreme right-wing parties have
more favourable party characteristics, in terms of party organization and lead-
ership, support for these parties is larger.
Relations between individual and contextual characteristics
So far, attention has focused on explaining differences between countries in
the level of extreme right-wing support. However, we may also expect differ-
ences between countries in the magnitude of the effects of individual-level
social background characteristics and sociopolitical attitudes. According to
theories of economic interests, we may expect that social groups in competi-
tive inter-ethnic circumstances are particularly more likely to vote for the
extreme right (Blalock 1967; Olzak 1992; Coenders & Scheepers 1998). Since
lower social strata are more likely to compete with ethnic minorities for scarce
resources, we may expect that people from these strata are especially sensi-
tive to competitive contextual circumstances (i.e., higher unemployment levels
and higher numbers of immigrants). Therefore, the extent to which one
belongs to the lower social strata increases the likelihood of voting extreme
right-wing may vary from one country to another. It can be expected that lower
social strata are more likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties in countries
where levels of inter-ethnic competition are higher.
With respect to public opinion, we may expect similar mechanisms to be
at work. Although we expect an unfavourable out-group attitude and dis-
satisfaction with democracy to increase the likelihood of voting for extreme
right-wing parties everywhere, this effect is likely to be stronger in countries
with higher levels of competition. Thus, people with stronger anti-immigrant
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attitudes and people who are more dissatisfied with democracy are more likely
to vote for extreme right-wing parties in countries where levels of inter-ethnic
competition are higher.
However, we can also expect that an unfavourable attitude towards out-
groups and dissatisfaction with democracy will increase still further the likeli-
hood of voting for the extreme right when party organizational conditions are
favourable. The idea is that in countries where the extreme right wing is badly
organized, people will be less likely to vote for such a party, even if they hold
antagonistic attitudes to out-groups or are dissatisfied with democracy. On the
other hand, in countries with a well-organised extreme right-wing party and a
charismatic party leader, even people with less extreme anti-immigrant atti-
tudes or feelings of dissatisfaction with democracy may cast their vote for 
the extreme right. The hypothesis would be that people with stronger anti-
immigrant attitudes and people who are more dissatisfied with democracy 
are more likely to vote for extreme right-wing parties in countries where the
organizational characteristics of the party are more favourable.
The relations between the issues discussed so far may be translated into a
funnel of causality (see Figure 1). This figure shows that social structural char-
acteristics of individuals as well individual attitudes affect extreme right-wing
voting at an individual level. Variations in extreme right-wing voting between
countries can be explained by compositional differences in social structure
(arrow A in Figure 1) and public opinion (arrow B). After controlling for both
differences in social structure and public opinion between countries, variations
between countries in levels of extreme right-wing voting will be smaller. In
addition to compositional differences, contextual country and party charac-
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Figure 1. Integrated model of cross-national differences in extreme right-wing voting.
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teristics affect differences in extreme right-wing voting between countries
(arrow C). Extreme right-wing voting is more likely in countries with high
levels of unemployment and immigrants, more space for the extreme right, a
more restrictive immigration climate and more favourable party characteris-
tics of the extreme right-wing parties themselves. This model also allows us to
examine how the contextual and individual levels are interrelated: the influ-
ence of social structure and public opinion may vary with differences in con-
textual characteristics. Hence, this model integrates both micro and macro
explanations of extreme right-wing voting.
Data
Survey data
The hypotheses are tested using data from 16 Western European countries 
in the 1990s (total N = 49,801).3 For all these countries, multiple data 
sets are brought together from three international comparative projects:
Eurobarometer 47.1 (Melich 2000), the Eurobarometer European Election
Study 1994 (Schmitt et al. 1996) and the ISSP National Identity Module 
(Zentralarchiv 1998). In addition, several national election surveys are added.
Appendix A indicates the sources and timescales of the data used. For detailed
documentation of the surveys we refer to the original codebooks (i.e., Melich
2000 for the Eurobarometer 47.1; Schmitt et al. 1996 for the European Elec-
tion Study 1994; Zentralarchiv 1998 for the National Identity Module of the
ISSP; Beerten et al. 1997 for Belgium; Andersen & Borre 1994 for Denmark;
CEVIPOF 1995 and 1997 (taken together) for France; Anker & Oppenhuis
1995 for the Netherlands; and Holmberg et al. 1994 for Sweden).
Eurobarometer and the ISSP are international consortia of survey organi-
zations that collect comparable cross-national data on social attitudes and
voting behaviour. The data were gathered in most countries using face-to-face
interviews with people aged 18 years and over. Each survey is a large repre-
sentative national sample of adults (of around 1,000 in each survey). The
advantage of the Eurobarometer and ISSP for cross-national research is that
the modules are fielded using fully comparable question wording, response
categories and sequencing in all countries. In addition, we added some national
election surveys in order to obtain a representative proportion of extreme-
right voters in each country. Only surveys with comparable question wordings
were added. Since we are interested in extreme-right voting of native-born
people, we only included them in the analyses.
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Expert judgement data
To test the hypotheses on opportunity structures for, and party characteristics
of, extreme right-wing parties we made use of data collected by means of an
expert judgement design (Lubbers 2000). From these data, we used questions
in which experts were asked to position (pre-selected) parties in their country
with respect to immigration policy, party organization, activity of the cadre of
parties and charisma of party leaders. In January 2000, 290 political scientists,
political sociologists and survey researchers from all European Union coun-
tries and Norway were asked to cooperate in the survey, following the method
of Huber & Inglehart (1995). These political experts were chosen randomly
from names found on the home pages of university departments in the respec-
tive countries who were familiar with research on the extreme right. Belgian
experts were divided into Walloon and Flemish experts, as both regions have
their own parties contesting national elections, though both groups were asked
to fill out questionnaires for the Flemish as well as the Walloon region. The
overall response was 51.7 percent, which may be considered good when,
for example, compared with the response rate of 41 per cent for Huber and
Inglehart (1995). The inter-expert reliability of the scales we used to test our
hypotheses may all be considered as good, or even extremely good (for more
detailed information, see Lubbers 2000).
Measurements
Extreme right-wing voting
Our dependent variable – ‘extreme right-wing voting’ – was measured in
several ways. In some surveys, respondents were asked to name the political
party they would vote for if there were a national election tomorrow, whereas
in others they were asked to name the party they voted for at the most recent
national election. We dichotomized the political parties into extreme right-
wing parties (1) and all other parties (0).4
In deciding whether a specific party should be categorized as being on the
extreme right, we used the results of the expert judgement survey. Based on
this survey only, parties which scored higher than 8.5 on a ten-point anti-
immigration scale were included. The highest score on the immigration-restric-
tion scale was 9.8 for the British National Party (UK), whereas the Partido
Socialista Revolucionario of Portugal received the lowest average score (0.5).
Comparisons with classifications of extreme right-wing parties by Kitschelt
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(1995), Mudde (1999) and van der Brug et al. (2000) show large similarities.
All parties classified as extreme right-wing parties in these studies score 8.5 
or higher on our immigration-restriction scale. The Portuguese Partido de 
Soldariedade Nacional (PSN), however, is an exception. The PSN is sometimes
considered to be an extreme right-wing party (Mudde 1999) and sometimes
not (Ignazi 1992; Jackman & Volpert 1996), but we considered the score of 6.3
on the immigration-restriction scale not high enough to take the party into
account as extreme right wing. The Italian ‘post-fascist’ Alleanza Nazionale
scored relatively low with 7.9; the German CSU scored even higher with 8.0.
Therefore, we left out the Italian Alleanza Nazionale. With this decision we
followed Kitschelt (1995), Knigge (1998) and van der Brug et al. (2000). More-
over, a recent in-depth study of the Alleanza Nazionale by ter Wal (2000)
shows indeed that this party cannot simply be classified as extreme right-wing,
but more as a nationalist-conservative party.
Table 1 shows the political parties in the 16 countries under investigation
that we consider to be extreme right wing. This Table also shows the propor-
tion of votes for the extreme right-wing parties in each country in the data.
Overall, this proportion is comparable to national election outcomes in this
period (mid-1990s). For most of the countries, however, the results for the
extreme right-wing parties in the data are slightly lower than their actual elec-
tion results.5
Individual social background characteristics
To measure social position, several indicators have been used.6 Educational
attainment is operationalized as the years of schooling a person has had. We
used information on the age at which the respondent had completed a full-
time education.7 A measure of social class was constructed, using the avail-
able information in these secondary data, to resemble the cross-national
comparable categorization of Erikson et al. (1983). We distinguished a number
of categories based on their actual social position in the labour force: the
service class (professionals, proprietors, general managers and junior man-
agers); routine non-manuals (people with an employed position at a desk);
self-employed people (farmers, fishermen and shop owners); and manual
workers (unskilled and skilled workers, as well as their supervisors). To these
classes we added as distinct categories those who were not active in the labour
force at the time: unemployed people, retired people, housewives and 
students.8
The religious measure distinguishes between non-religious people, reli-
gious people belonging to non-Christian denominations and Christian people.
Other important individual characteristics to explain extreme right-wing
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voting (gender and age) are included using conventional measures. The
surveys were conducted in 1994, 1995 and 1997 – therefore we also included
a ‘year’ variable to explore possible time effects.
Individual attitudes
The two clusters of attitudinal positions that were found to be most important
in explaining extreme right-wing voting (i.e., anti-immigrant attitudes and
political dissatisfaction) are both available in all the surveys under considera-
tion in this study.9 To measure anti-immigrant attitudes the following question
was asked of respondents: ‘Do you think that there are too many immigrants
in our country?’ Respondents could indicate on a scale to what extent they
agreed with this item. To construct comparable units across different surveys,
extreme right-wing voting in western europe
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Table 1. Extreme right-wing parties and proportion of votes in 16 European countries
Extreme Number and
right-wing percentage of Election results in the 
Country party votes in data 1990s (percentage)
Austria FPÖ 250 (18.4) 21.9 (1995) 26.9 (1999)
Belgium:
Flemish region VB 313 (10.1) 12.3 (1995) 15.5 (1999)
Walloon region FN 45 (2.2) 5.2 (1995) 4.0 (1999)
Denmark FKP, DF 220 (5.2) 6.4 (1994) 9.8 (1998)
Finland IKL 0 <0.5 (1995)1 <0.5 (1999)1
France FN 746 (9.8) 12.4 (1993) 14.9 (1997)
Germany Rep, DVU, NPD 133 (2.3) 2.0 (1994) 2.9 (1998)
United Kingdom BNP 0 <0.5 (1992)1 <0.5 (1997)1
Greece EM 0 <0.5 (1993)1 <0.5 (1996)1
Ireland NPI 0 <0.5 (1993) <0.5 (1997)
Italy LN, MSI-T 151 (5.9) 8.4 (1994) 10.1 (1996)
Luxembourg NB 3 (0.3) <0.5 (1994) 0 (1999)
Netherlands CD 58 (1.5) 2.5 (1994) 0.6 (1998)
Norway FKP 75 (6.7) 6.0 (1993) 15.3 (1997)
Portugal AN 0 <0.5 (1995)1 <0.5 (1999)1
Spain DN, Fal 3 (0.1) <0.5 (1994)1 <0.5 (1998)1
Sweden ND, SD 138 (3.6) 1.2 (1994) <0.5 (1998)1
Total 2135 (4.3)
1 <0.5 = less than 0.5 per cent of the votes; these results are mostly subsumed into the 
category of ‘other parties’.
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all categories of the items have been scored into equal intervals between 0 and
100. The higher the score of this variable, the more negative people are about
the number of immigrants in their country. ‘Dissatisfaction with democracy’ is
measured by asking respondents: ‘Would you say that you are satisfied or 
not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in your country?’ Again
respondents could indicate on a scale to what extent they agreed. Also, for
comparability, the items have been scored on equal intervals between 0 and
100. The higher the score on this variable, the more dissatisfied people are with
the way democracy works in their country.10
Economic country characteristics
Contextual country characteristics are presented in Table 2. The figures for the
proportion of non-Western citizens as well as for unemployment rates are
derived from international organizations that put a lot of effort into con-
structing comparable statistics. Figures for the number of non-Western citi-
zens as a percentage of the total population were taken from European social
statistics on immigration compiled by the European Commission (1999). We
have chosen to use ‘non-European Union citizens’ as ‘data availability is gener-
ally better across the Member States for population by citizenship than for
flows of international migrants’ (EC 1999: 9).11 Examining the international
statistics in Table 2, it becomes clear that substantial differences exist 
within Western Europe in the size of the non-European Union population.
In Germany and Austria, the percentage of non-European Union citizens is
highest, whereas in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Sweden the per-
centage is lower but still substantial. In countries like Finland, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal and Spain the percentage of non-European Union citizens is
the lowest.
Figures on unemployment were derived from the Statistical Yearbook of
the United Nations (1995).12 In the mid-1990s unemployment levels were 
particularly high in Spain and Finland. They were less high but still above 
10 per cent in Germany, the Walloon region of Belgium, Ireland, France, Italy,
Denmark and Greece. Unemployment levels were lower than ten per cent in
the United Kingdom, Sweden, Flanders, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal,
Norway and Luxembourg (in declining order).
Political characteristics
To examine opportunity structures for extreme right-wing parties, we took into
account the position of all parties on the immigration-restriction scale derived
from the expert judgement data. The immigration-restriction scale ranged
marcel lubbers, mérove gijsberts & peer scheepers
© European Consortium for Political Research 2002
359
from 0 ‘not at all restrictive’ to 10 ‘very restrictive’. The inter-expert reliabil-
ity of this scale was above 0.90 in each country (Lubbers 2000).
To test our hypothesis with respect to opportunity structures for the
extreme right we also have to consider other parties’ positions on the immi-
gration issue. To calculate the space for an extreme right-wing party we took
into account the most restrictive party in a country not belonging to the
extreme right-wing party family. In all Western European countries it turned
out to be the major liberal or (Christian)-conservative party (of which the
German CSU had the highest average score of 8.0). The space between these
liberal or conservative parties and the extreme right-wing parties is the bat-
tlefield for votes with respect to the immigration issue. The relative space for
the extreme right can then be constructed as 10 minus the average between
the score of the extreme right-wing party on the immigration-restriction scale
and the score of the next most restrictive party outside the extreme right. This
extreme right-wing voting in western europe
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Table 2. Economic country characteristics (unemployment rate and percentage of non-
European Union citizens), political country characteristics (space for extreme right-wing
and immigration-restriction climate) and characteristics of extreme right parties
Favourable
party
Non EU- Space for Immigration- characteristics
Unemployment citizens extreme restriction of extreme
Country rate (percentage) right climate right
Austria 6.6 6.0 2.4 6.4 7.6
Belgium:
Flemish region 7.2 3.7 1.5 5.8 7.7
Walloon region 12.5 3.7 2.1 4.0 2.8
Denmark 10.3 2.9 1.7 5.8 4.8
Finland 17.4 1.0 1.8 4.5 2.3
France 11.6 4.0 2.0 5.7 7.5
Germany 12.9 6.4 1.3 5.2 2.7
United Kingdom 8.5 2.1 1.4 5.7 4.2
Greece 10.0 1.1 1.5 5.6 2.2
Ireland 12.2 0.6 2.2 5.7 2.7
Italy 11.1 1.0 1.5 5.6 5.3
Luxembourg 2.7 3.1 1.8 4.3 4.3 (mean)
Netherlands 7.1 3.7 1.3 5.5 2.6
Norway 4.9 2.4 2.5 5.8 6.4
Portugal 5.5 1.2 1.8 3.6 4.3 (mean)
Spain 22.9 0.6 1.8 4.9 3.3
Sweden 7.7 4.1 2.1 5.0 2.4
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is presented in Figure 2. For countries with more than one extreme right-wing
party, we base our measure on the least restrictive of them. According to this
measure, the Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom turned out to
have least space for the extreme right (see Table 2). This was particularly due
to the high scores for the Dutch Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Demokratie
(VVD), the German Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU) and the British 
Conservatives. Norway and Austria, on the other hand, had most space 
for the extreme right wing, as a result of the relatively lower scores for the
Norwegian conservative Høyre, and the Austrian conservative Österreichische
Volkspartei (ÖVP).
To test Thraenhardt’s hypothesis (1992) that extreme right-wing parties
receive more support in countries with a more conservative climate on immi-
gration (i.e., where parties are overall more restrictive towards immigrants),
we constructed a measure based on all parties. The score on the immigration-
restriction scale of each party in any country was multiplied by the percent-
age of voters for the party and divided by the total percentage of votes.13
This resulted in a measure in which larger parties have a relatively larger
impact on the immigration-restriction climate in a country. As can be seen in
Table 2,Austria, Flanders and Denmark score highest due to the rather restric-
tive social-democratic parties in these countries, whereas in the Belgian
Walloon region and Portugal the immigration-restriction climate score is
lowest.
To measure characteristics of the extreme right-wing parties, the expert
judges assigned a number on a scale from 1 to 10 to each party in their respec-
tive countries for the organization, membership activism and the charisma 
of the party leader. Initially, we tried to build a model in which all three 
party characteristics were included, but as the three variables turned out to 
be strongly correlated, this caused multicollinearity (Condition Index 68.4).
Therefore, we constructed a scale reflecting favourable party characteristics
(labelled ‘extreme right-wing party organizational strength’) from the vari-
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Figure 2. Calculation of the space for the extreme right-wing parties.
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ables ‘organization’, ‘charisma’ and ‘active membership’. The Cronbach’s alpha
of 0.91 indicates that this is a very reliable scale.14 The Flemish Vlaams Blok
and the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) scored highest of all
extreme right-wing parties (see Table 2). Moreover, Jörg Haider received the
highest charisma score, followed by Blöcher of the Schweizerisches Volkspartei
and Berlusconi of the Italian Forza Italia.
Statistical models
To test our hypotheses we used multilevel analysis. This technique allowed us
to test individual characteristics (of respondents) and contextual characteris-
tics (of countries) simultaneously, and gives information on the variance in
extreme right-wing voting at the contextual level (Snijders & Bosker 1999).
By introducing context characteristics, we can find out whether the variance
is explained by characteristics of countries, whereas the introduction of indi-
vidual-level characteristics makes it possible to control for composition effects
at the contextual level (random intercept models). This is particularly inter-
esting since we test theories that make predictions at the individual level 
as well as at the contextual level. Moreover, multilevel analysis allows us to
test whether the individual-level effects (slopes) vary across countries and
whether this variation can be explained by cross-level interactions (random
slope models). Neglecting the multilevel structure may lead to various errors,
for example shift of meaning and ecological fallacy in cases of aggregation 
and risks of Type I errors in cases of disaggregation (Snijders & Bosker 
1999: 13).
As we deal with a binomial dependent response variable (i.e., voting for
the extreme right-wing versus any other party) we employed logistic regres-
sion analysis (within the program MlwiN; Rasbash et al. 1999: 105). For the
interpretation of the models, a positive parameter which is significant at the a
< 0.05 level denotes that the likelihood of voting for the extreme right is
increased, whereas a negative parameter indicates a decreased likelihood.
Results
Table 3 presents parameter estimates and, in the lower portion, variance com-
ponents of logistic multilevel analyses explaining differences in extreme right-
wing voting. The null-model hypothesis represents the percentage of extreme
right-wing voters, controlled for variations between countries.
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Table 3. Parameter estimates from logistic multilevel models on voting for extreme right-wing parties in Western Europe (Standard errors are
within parentheses; for model V, the log-odds (Exp(b)) and Wald statistic are presented) (N = 49,801)
Models 0 I II III IV V Exp(b) Wald
Constant -3.21 -4.15 -4.39 -4.50 -4.62 -5.01
(0.32) (0.33) (0.36) (0.34) (0.33) (0.31)
Social background characteristics
Occupation:
Manual workers 0.63 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.35 1.42 12.5
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Self-employed 0.70 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.39 1.48 10.1
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Routine non-manual workers 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.40 0.32 1.38 10.5
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Service class (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Unemployed 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 0.73 2.08 41.2
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Housewives 0.76 0.76 0.76 0.74 0.50 1.65 18.6
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Students 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.09 1.09 0.4
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Retired/other 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.65 0.41 1.51 14.4
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
Education in years -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.26 -0.14 0.87 25.4
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Religious denomination:
Christian (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Other religion -0.59 -0.59 -0.60 -0.60 -0.50 0.61 5.4
(0.21) (0.20) (0.21) (0.19) (0.21)
Non-religious 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.18 1.20 10.2
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Age -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27 -0.28 0.76 59.2
















 for Political R
esearch 2002
Gender:
Male 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.57 0.64 1.89 157.0
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Female (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Year:
1994 (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
1995 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.26 1.30 18.6
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
1997 -0.07 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 0.94 1.0
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Country characteristics
Unemployment rate -0.53 -0.09 -0.08 -0.10 0.90 0.2
(0.30) (0.28) (0.29) (0.27)
Non-EU citizens 0.76 0.72 0.84 0.89 2.44 9.1
(0.35) (0.33) (0.33) (0.30)
Space for extreme right-wing 0.19 0.01 0.13 1.14 0.2
(0.29) (0.30) (0.27)
Immigration-restriction climate 0.77 0.21 0.39 1.48 2.2
(0.26) (0.28) (0.26)
Party characteristics
Extreme right-wing party 0.93 0.72 2.04 3.9
organizational strength (0.40) (0.36)
Political attitudes
Anti-immigrant attitude 0.90 2.46 789.3
(0.03)
Dissatisfaction with democracy 0.43 1.54 322.5
(0.02)
Variance estimates
Level 2: country 1.72 1.68 1.82 1.52 1.45 1.17
(0.59) (0.58) (0.64) (0.54) (0.52) (0.43)
Level 1: individual 1 1 1 1 1 1
Note: Bold parameters express significance p < 0.05.
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In Model I, individual social background characteristics are taken into
account to examine whether people from the lower social strata are more
likely to vote for the extreme right. We find that the expected effects on the
individual level indeed hold. Manual workers, the self-employed, routine non-
manual workers and the unemployed are more likely to vote for extreme right-
wing parties (compared to the service class), but this also holds true for
housewives and retired people. Less well educated people are more likely to
vote for an extreme right-wing party too. Furthermore, it turns out that non-
religious voters, men and younger people are over-represented in the extreme
right-wing electorate. We also find that in 1995 support for the extreme right
wing was a little above that of 1994. However, the effect of year – and hence
of different datasets – is rather small. Now, our expectation was that if a
country has more people from the categories that were found to be more likely
to vote for extreme right-wing parties, this could explain differences between
countries in support for the extreme right. However, the variance components
in Table 3 show that by including individual social characteristics, the variance
between countries hardly decreases. This implies that differences between
countries in support for the extreme right cannot be attributed to differences
between countries in their social structural composition.
When economic characteristics are added to the model (Model II of Table
3) we would expect support for the extreme right to be higher in countries
with a higher level of labour-market competition. We included both propor-
tions of non-European Union citizens and unemployment levels at the country
level. As expected, we found that the larger the proportion of non-European
Union citizens living in a country, the higher the proportion voting for the
extreme right. However, contrary to our hypothesis, differences between levels
of unemployment are not significant and the relationship is even negative
related to differences in the level of extreme right voting. The variance
between countries increases somewhat due to the fact that Italy does not fit
the model. (We discuss this finding further below.)
Next we turn to political explanations of variations in extreme right wing
support. On the one hand, we expected that in countries where the space for
extreme right-wing parties on the immigration issue is larger, the support for
these parties would be larger. On the other hand, we expected – following
Thraenhardt (1992) – that in countries where the political climate surround-
ing immigration is more restrictive, support for the extreme right wing would
be larger. To test these expectations we included a variable measuring 
the space for the extreme right wing in a country and a variable measuring
the immigration-restriction climate in Table 3 (Model III). The findings show
that the space for the extreme right wing does not affect variations between
marcel lubbers, mérove gijsberts & peer scheepers
© European Consortium for Political Research 2002
365
countries in extreme right wing support, but the immigration-restriction
climate does. In countries where the political climate towards immigration 
is more restrictive, support for extreme right-wing parties is significantly
larger.
As well as the political characteristics of a country, we also investigated 
the characteristics of the extreme right-wing parties themselves. Therefore, we
included a variable measuring the extent to which extreme right-wing parties
have favourable characteristics (i.e., the party organization, the charisma of
the party leader and whether the party has an active cadre – Model IV of 
Table 3). It turned out that party characteristics are important in explaining
the success of the extreme right. In countries where extreme right-wing parties
have more favourable party characteristics, support for these parties is 
larger. This effect, moreover, makes the effect of a restrictive climate towards
immigration spurious. The effect of this latter variable becomes non-
significant once the organizational strength of the extreme right party is
included (see Model IV of Table 3). An interpretation for this finding could
be that extreme right-wing parties with greater organizational strength are
more influential in the political debate, thereby creating a more restrictive
immigration climate.
Finally, Model V in Table 3 includes political attitudes (i.e., anti-immigrant
attitudes and feelings of political dissatisfaction). We found that the expected
effects on the individual level hold. People who believe that there are too
many immigrants in their country, and who are dissatisfied with the way
democracy works, are significantly more likely to vote for extreme right-wing
parties. We introduced these attitudes in the last step of the model because,
theoretically, they can be assumed to mediate the effects of social background
and the country characteristics on extreme right-wing voting. Model V reveals
that the effects of social class and education on voting for the extreme right
wing indeed decrease after controlling for the impact of attitudes. However,
this holds neither for the other individual characteristics nor for the effect of
non-European Union citizens. Overall, we can conclude that attitudinal dif-
ferences are in part responsible for the effects of social class and education on
extreme right-wing voting, which is in line with previous research (Lubbers &
Scheepers 2000; Lubbers et al. 2000) and conventional path analysis (Davis
1985).
Moreover, we expected that after controlling for differences in public
opinion, differences between Western European countries in extreme right-
wing voting would be reduced. Model V shows that between-country differ-
ences in extreme right-wing voting can indeed be explained by differences in
public opinion. The variance components in Table 3 show that by including
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individual political attitudes, the variance between countries decreases sub-
stantively. This means that differences between countries in support for the
extreme right wing are partly due to differences between countries in public
opinion on immigrants and the way democracy works.
Model V (Table 3) also presents the log-odds (Exp(b)) and the Wald sta-
tistics. The log-odds of the noncategorical variables can be compared because
the measures are standardized. Odds smaller than one – for example, the effect
of education – indicate that the likelihood of voting for the extreme right
decreases when education is higher. Odds larger than one – for example, the
effect of attitudes towards immigration – indicate that the likelihood of voting
for a party of the extreme right compared to voting for other parties increases
with stronger anti-immigration attitudes. The Wald statistic is dependent on
the effect and its standard error and indicates the contribution of the effect 
to the overall explanation of extreme right-wing voting. It is clear that anti-
immigration attitudes make the largest contribution to explaining extreme
right-wing voting.
Explaining the between-country variation
The main question addressed in this article was to what extent cross-national
variation in extreme right-wing voting could be explained. Initially, inclusion
of political characteristics, relating both to political context and to the char-
acteristics of extreme right-wing parties themselves, decreased the variance
between countries. Moreover, variations in the composition of the population,
not in social background but in political attitudes, helped account for cross-
national differences too. Thus, a considerable part of the original country-level
variance was explained. This is illustrated in Figure 3, which displays the resid-
uals for the 16 countries in our five models. By comparing the residuals of the
different models, one can ascertain how much is to be gained by including the
relevant contextual characteristics of a particular country.
The residuals of Model 0 correspond with the observed differences in
extreme right-wing voting between the countries as presented in Table 1. By
including all individual social characteristics, the country-level residuals 
are hardly reduced (Model I). By also including economic context variables
(Model II), the residuals are reduced in some countries with high levels of
extreme right-wing voting such as Austria and Flanders, but this is countered
above all by Italy. Unemployment levels and numbers of non-Western citizens
do not explain the high level of right-wing voting in Italy because unemploy-
ment is high in Italy (see Table 2) – especially in the south – whereas the per-
centage of non-European Union citizens is very low (see again Table 2), again
especially in the south. If we could have divided Italy between north and
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south, the residual for Italy would have been lower, the effect of unemploy-
ment even more strongly negative and the effect of the presence of non-
European Union citizens probably more strongly positive, since the Lega Nord
attracts votes almost exclusively in the north.
The residuals of Model III and IV show that by including political charac-
teristics the country-level residuals are considerably reduced (e.g., extreme
right-wing voting was high in France and Flanders). In Figure 3, we see that
this high average in France is to a large extent the result of political context,
whereas in Flanders favourable characteristics of the Vlaams Blok explain its
success. Finally, by including public opinion, country-level residuals are
reduced, especially in Italy. So, high levels of extreme right-wing support in
Italy stem to a considerable extent from higher levels of anti-immigrant atti-
tudes and political dissatisfaction. For most countries the models appeared to
fit well, but, aside from Italy, the models fit less well in Denmark and Sweden.
For these countries, there must be other reasons, which have not been included
in the model, to explain why country effects remain.
Cross-level interactions
Finally, we examine whether the effects of individual characteristics vary
across countries. Table 4 presents models in which these cross-level interac-
tions are specified. From the social background characteristics, only the effect
of education varied between countries. Model VIa presents the cross-national
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Figure 3. Country-level residuals in extreme right-wing voting.
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Table 4. Parameter estimates from logistic random slope models with cross-level interac-
tions on voting for extreme right-wing parties in Western Europe (Standard errors are within
parentheses) (N = 49,801)
Random slope models VIa VIb VIIa VIIb VIIIa V
Constant -4.95 -4.99 -5.02 -4.98 -4.86 -5.02
(0.31) (0.31) (0.33) (0.35) (0.34) (0.35)
Social background characteristics
Occupation:
Manual workers 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
Self-employed 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.40
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Routine non-manual workers 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.34
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Service class (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Unemployed 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.74
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Housewives 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.51
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Students 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Retired/other 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.43
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11)
Education in years -0.24 -0.21 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14
(0.09) (0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Religious denomination:
Christian (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Other religion -0.49 -0.50 -0.48 -0.47 -0.50 -0.51
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21) (0.20) (0.21)
Non-religious 0.18 0.18 0.21 0.21 0.16 0.17
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
Age -0.27 -0.27 -0.28 -0.27 -0.27 -0.27
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Gender:
Male 0.61 0.61 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.64
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Female (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
Year:
1994 (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref) (ref)
1995 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.26 0.27
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
1997 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.09 -0.09
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Country characteristics
Unemployment rate 0.03 -0.06 -0.21 0.02 0.03 -0.33
(0.27) (0.27) (0.27) (0.31) (0.24) (0.31)
Non-EU citizens 0.91 0.86 0.84 0.91 0.99 0.88
(0.29) (0.30) (0.29) (0.35) (0.26) (0.34)
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Table 4. continued
Random slope models VIa VIb VIIa VIIb VIIIa V
Space for extreme right-wing 0.21 0.22 0.08 0.07 -0.08 -0.04
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.24) (0.24)
Immigration-restriction climate 0.33 0.34 0.36 0.35 0.18 0.22
(0.27) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.24) (0.24)
Party characteristics
Extreme right-wing party 0.84 0.82 0.71 0.78 0.95 0.89
organizational strength (0.36) (0.35) (0.36) (0.41) (0.32) (0.40)
Political attitudes
Anti-immigrant attitude 0.88 0.88 0.85 0.81 0.89 0.90
(0.03) (0.03) (0.14) (0.14) (0.03) (0.03)
Dissatisfaction with democracy 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.38 0.45
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.11) (0.10)
Cross-level interactions
Education * unemployment 0.11
(0.09)
Education * non-EU citizens 0.03
(0.09)
Too many immigrants * -0.23
unemployment (0.14)
Too many immigrants * non-EU -0.05
citizens (0.15)
Too many immigrants * extreme -0.05
right wing strength (0.15)
Dissatisfaction with democracy * 0.21
unemployment (0.11)
Dissatisfaction with democracy * 0.05
non-EU citizens (0.10)
Dissatisfaction with democracy * 0.01
extreme right wing strength (0.10)
Variance estimates
Level 2: country 1.23 1.21 1.49 1.58 1.63 1.55
(0.44) (0.44) (0.55) (0.58) (0.60) (0.56)
Education slope variance 0.08 0.08
(0.04) (0.04)
Intercept-education slope -0.13 -0.13
covariance (0.09) (0.10)
Too many immigrants slope 0.23 0.25
variance (0.10) (0.11)
Intercept-too many immigrants -0.30 -0.34
slope covariance (0.19) (0.20)
Dissatisfaction with democracy 0.15 0.11
slope variance (0.06) (0.05)
Intercept-dissatisfaction with -0.36 -0.29
democracy slope covariance (0.16) (0.14)
Level 1: individual 1 1 1 1 1 1
Note: Bold parameters express significance p < 0.05.
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variation in the effect ‘education’, which is small, but significant (0.08). The co-
variance (the correlation between intercept variance and the random slope
variance of education) is not significant. Residual analyses (not presented
here) show that the effect of education is smaller than average in Austria and
Italy, but particularly greater than average in Denmark, the Netherlands and
Norway. The hypothesis that effects of education vary across countries because
of differences in competitive circumstances has to be rejected. Model VIb
shows that interactions between education and unemployment levels as well
as the number of non-European Union citizens are not relevant in explaining
extreme right-wing voting.
With respect to public opinion, we find similar effects. Both effects of anti-
immigrant attitudes and dissatisfaction with democracy vary in their magni-
tude across countries. This is expressed in the parameters at the bottom of the
Models VIIa and VIIIa, respectively. Based on residual analyses, in Norway,
the Netherlands and Denmark the anti-immigration effect is larger than on
average, whereas in Austria, Italy and Sweden it is much smaller. Again, in
Italy and Sweden, but also in Norway, dissatisfaction with democracy is a far
weaker predictor of extreme right-wing voting than in the other countries,
whereas its effect is larger in the Belgian Walloon region. Nevertheless, these
differences between countries can neither be explained in terms of competi-
tive circumstances (unemployment level and non-European Union citizens)
nor in terms of favourable party characteristics of the extreme right-wing
parties themselves. As can be found in Models VIIb and VIIIb, the interaction
estimates turned out to be non-significant.
Conclusions
In this article we set out to explain differences in extreme right-wing voting
between all Western European countries from a multidisciplinary and multi-
level perspective. To this end, we included a wide variety of sociological, eco-
nomic and political factors which have been put forward in previous studies
as relevant in explaining extreme right-wing voting. We specified individual-
level and contextual-level explanations and their interrelationships, which we
tested simultaneously with pooled data on almost 50,000 respondents, together
with country-level statistics and expert judgement data on extreme right-wing
parties.
Regarding the sociological factors, we found that across Western European
countries, unemployed people were particularly more likely to vote for an
extreme right-wing party. This also holds for the less well educated, non-
religious people, younger voters and men. Between-country differences
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related to the social-structural composition of the population hardly ex-
plained any cross-national differences in voting for extreme right-wing parties.
Variation between countries in extreme right-wing support appeared to be
explained much better by differences between countries in public opinion. The
stronger the popularity of anti-immigrant attitudes and the stronger the dis-
satisfaction with democracy, the larger the support for the extreme right in a
country.
Turning to economic factors, economic malaise and competition with immi-
grants were suspected of being of relevance in explaining cross-national vari-
ation in extreme right-wing support. The number of non-European Union
citizens did affect levels of extreme right-wing voting in a country, in line with
theories of economic interests. People who perceive immigrants as competi-
tors are more likely to express exclusionary reactions including voting for the
extreme right. Unemployment levels did not, however, have the expected
effect. The effect of unemployment even tended to be negative, suggesting that
in more prosperous countries people are more likely to support extreme right-
wing parties – a finding consistent with other research on exclusionary reac-
tions (Scheepers et al. 2001). It could be that people in these circumstances
are afraid to lose what they have gained in times of economic prosperity. This
could be a reason why in countries like Austria, Norway and Flanders people
are more likely to support extreme right-wing policies. Although not
addressed in this article, it could also explain why people are more likely to
vote for extreme right-wing parties, particularly in richer regions within coun-
tries, such as northern Italy, southern Germany and the Strasbourg region in
France.
One of the most important conclusions of this research is that political
factors are of major importance in explaining extreme right-wing support.
Extreme right-wing parties that have favourable party characteristics (like a
charismatic leader, a well-organized party and an active cadre) are much more
successful in national elections than parties which lack these. The Austrian
FPÖ, the Flemish Vlaams Blok, the French Front National, the Italian Lega
Nord and the Norwegian Progress Party have such characteristics, which
increase the likelihood of the electorate voting for these parties. Remarkably,
the characteristics of extreme right-wing parties turned out to be more im-
portant than other political factors, for example the space in the political 
spectrum for extreme right-wing platforms on the immigration issue and 
the general anti-immigrant climate in a country. These effects turned out to
be spurious, which we could not have detected without testing for all factors
simultaneously.
Between countries, individual-level effects of education and sociopolitical
attitudes turned out to vary. Differences in these effects could, however, not
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be explained by differences in the national context. Thus, in countries with
higher levels of ethnic competition or in countries where the extreme right
wing has more favourable party characteristics, voting for these parties was
not affected strongly by education, anti-immigrant attitudes and political dis-
satisfaction. Regarding differences in effects of attitudes, we may propose
another cross-level explanation: the effects of attitudes may vary according 
to the differences of the party programmes. We found that voting for the 
FPÖ, the Lega Nord and Ny Demokrati is less well predicted by an anti-
immigration attitude. The reason for this may be that these parties are also
the extreme right-wing parties least explicitly ventilating these attitudes.
In our analyses, a large portion of the variation in extreme right-wing
voting between countries has been explained, implying that we have included
most relevant factors (Husbands 1998). However, some variation remains
unexplained. First, we have to underline that Italy is a special case. The Lega
Nord is a separatist party and, thus, a party of northern Italians only. If we
could have split Italy into north and south, Italy would have fitted the models
much better, thus allowing them to explain a larger part of the cross-national
variation in extreme right-wing voting. Furthermore, Husbands (1998) also
distinguished an historical factor. In some countries the ‘breeding-ground’ for
extreme right-wing parties is more favourable since numerous organizations
dating from the fascist era persist and because of traditions of support for the
extreme right. This is possibly reflected in our measurement of party charac-
teristics. Indeed, in Austria, France and Flanders this could provide an addi-
tional explanation. In these countries there are now strong exclusionary
parties as there were in the interwar period. On the other hand, the meagre
results for Germany may speak against such a general explanation. Moreover,
comparison between the fascist parties of the 1930s and contemporary right-
wing extremism is highly problematic, as both movements are considerably
different (Kitschelt 1995).
Other possible explanations for variations between countries in extreme
right-wing success might be that the activities of anti-racist groups and active
interventionist roles on the part of law enforcement authorities and govern-
ments might have stopped the rise of right-wing extremism in some countries.
These explanations are however hard to test, and have an ad hoc character.
All in all, this article has shown that with multilevel modelling differences and
similarities between European countries in predicting extreme right-wing
voting could be found, whereas at the same time, these differences could be
explained in a systematic way. Moreover, by building on a more extensive
dataset than in previous research and taking into account more comprehen-
sive sets of explanatory factors, this article has revealed the importance of
studying right-wing extremism in its context.
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Notes
1. This can be linked to theories of the relationship between social class and left-right
voting: the economic interest theory of voting behaviour (Downs 1957). Its basic idea
is that voters are rational and self-interested, they vote for the party whose policies will
bring them the greatest utility. The general notion that people in different positions vote
differently because they have different interests can be applied to explain extreme right-
wing voting as well.
2. Although some researchers also take into account the attitudinal left-right self-
placement as a proxy for a set of attitudes to explain extreme right-wing voting (van
der Brug et al. 2000), we prefer to take into account a more content-related set of atti-
extreme right-wing voting in western europe
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Appendix A: Data sources and nett number of cases for 16 countries1
National
election
EES Eurobarometer ISSP surveys
Country 1994 1997 1995 1994–19972 Total
Austria 694 662 1356
Belgium:
Flemish region 797 338 1977 3112
Walloon region 562 254 1234 2050
Denmark 1738 725 1803 4266
Finland 688 688
France 1521 691 5382 7594
United Kingdom 1732 772 850 3354
Germany 2996 1265 1621 5882
Greece 1456 642 2098
Ireland 1397 629 366 2392
Italy 1271 528 752 2551
Luxembourg 677 341 1018
Netherlands 1769 777 1228 3774
Norway 1114 1114
Portugal 1269 586 1855
Spain 1378 625 844 2847
Sweden 727 814 2309 3850
Total 18,563 10,282 7023 13,933 49,801
1 The nett number of cases excludes the category of non-voters.
2 For Belgium: General Election Study 1995; for Denmark: Danish Election Survey 1994;
for France: Post-election Survey of 1995 and 1997 (taken together); for the Netherlands:
NKO 1994; and for Sweden: Election Study 1994.
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tudes. With this we follow the work of Billiet and De Witte (1995), Kitschelt (1995) and
Mayer (1999). Moreover, Ignazi (1992) and Mayer and Perrineau (1992) argued that the
placement of extreme right-wing voters on the left-right scale is rather diffuse.
3. The Belgian Flemish and Walloon regions are studied separately because these regions
have separate extreme right-wing parties contesting elections and both regions have
their own parliamentary representatives.
4. Unfortunately, we were not able to follow a multinomial approach since the cross-
national comparison makes it impossible to distinguish the same party families in each
country without too many empty cells.
5. Note that the dates of survey collection do not exactly correspond the dates of national
elections. Nevertheless, for Germany and the Netherlands the results are comparable
to the outcomes in general elections, whereas for Sweden there is even some over-
representation in the survey data. For Austria, Flanders, France and Italy the under-
representation is approximately 3 per cent and for the Belgian Walloon region it is some-
what lower. The situation for Norway and Denmark is harder to judge. The results in
the data (which are from 1995) for the Norwegian Progress Party (6.7 per cent) resem-
ble the 1993 election outcomes of 6 per cent, but are much lower than those of 1997
when the party gained 15 per cent of the votes. For Denmark, the survey data contain-
ing 5.4 per cent of votes for the extreme right wing, which is probably quite close to real
outcomes. In 1994, the Progress Party scored 6.4 per cent, but its support declined
strongly. The newly founded Danish People’s Party gained strongly in the 1998 general
elections, taking the total extreme right-wing support above 9 per cent. However, the
survey data we use are collected in a period in which this latter extreme right-wing party
was still non-existent. Finally, in countries where extreme right-wing support was almost
absent, we found similar results in the data.
6. Unfortunately we were not able to include income, because this variable was missing in
part of the European election study of 1994.
7. To compute the number of years the respondent had enjoyed educational training 
we subtracted 6 years (i.e., the age at which formal education starts in most European
countries).
8. In the Eurobarometer data this variable was measured in its present form. In the ISSP
data, however, it had to be constructed from several variables. First, a variable indicat-
ing whether respondents are currently employed or not. Among the non-employed a
further distinction was made between unemployed, students, retired and housekeepers.
Second, respondents currently employed were coded into EGP classes on the basis of
data on their occupation, self-employment and supervisory status. The occupation codes
were translated into EGP (classification made by Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero,
1983) scores through the Ganzeboom et al. (1989) re-coding scheme.
9. We are, however, not able to measure nationalistic and authoritarian attitudes in all
surveys under consideration.
10. We acknowledge that in some of our data the question wording of both attitudinal
dimensions was slightly different (for example, in the Eurobarometer the question was:
‘Speaking about people from minority groups in terms of race, religion and culture, do
you think there are not many, a lot but not too many, or too many of them living in your
country?’, whereas in the ISSP data this question was measured on a 5-point scale: ‘Do
you think that the number of immigrants to [country] should be increased a lot (1) or
reduced a lot (5)?’ and, in the French election surveys, a 3-point scale was used: ‘There
are too many immigrants in France’). We can consider the scales to be functionally
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equivalent. This is validated by additional analyses in which the effects of the attitudes
were estimated for each country in each dataset separately. The results showed that
within countries the effects were highly similar. Moreover, analyses on Eurobarometer
(1994, 1997) data only, in which the attitudes were measured identically, provided similar
results and led to the same substantive conclusion regarding the public opinion com-
position effect. Results of these additional analyses can be requested from the authors.
11. We acknowledge that even in this definition some problems occur which refer to dif-
ferences in naturalization and acceptance of double citizenship or not. Nevertheless,
this will not severely disturb the ranking of the countries with respect to number of
immigrants.
12. In the international standard definition of the International Labour Organization (ILO),
the ‘unemployed’ category consists of all persons above a specific age who are not in
paid employment or self-employed, but are available for work and have taken steps to
seek paid work.
13. This did not add up to 100 per cent because not all of the small parties in each country
have been taken into account.
14. Since the extreme right-wing splinter groups in Luxembourg and Portugal are not 
considered in the expert judgement survey, we assigned the average score to these 
countries.
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